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NOTE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL MARKET-BASED
DEBT STRATEGY TO REGULATE PRIVATE LENDING TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
I. INTRODUCTION
As national economies become increasingly interconnected through
the expansion of international trade and investment, international
banking grows in size and importance. National boundaries have all
but vanished for the large "money center" banks.' Banks lend to
foreign governments and private individuals, finance international
trade and investment, and make equity investments and place deposits
in foreign banks. As international banking continues to develop,
international bank regulation becomes increasingly important to the
efficient operation of the global economy. 2
National regulatory institutions provide an inadequate framework
within which to regulate banks' international operations.' A recent
assessment of national bank regulatory institutions concluded that
while global coordination among these institutions has improved in
recent years, new arrangements, expanded institutional authority, and
perhaps new institutions are needed to cope with current global
financial challenges .4
While U.S. banks such as Citibank, Chemical, and Chase Manhattan have
traditionally dominated international banking, many Japanese and European banks
joined the ranks of those money center banks in the 1980's. A substantial amount
of the revenues of these banks comes from overseas transactions and investments.
Glidden, Capital-Based Limits on International Banking, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & Com.
REG., 465 n.1 (1986).
2 Generally, bank regulation has two goals: to enable banks to withstand external
disturbances such as credit, interest rate or other shocks, and to promote the efficiency
and integrity of financial services. See R. DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
BANKINO 3 (1984); M. WATSON, P. KELLER & D. MATHIESON, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 18 (1984) (Occasional Papers of the Int'l
Monetary Fund No. 31).
1 Hackney & Shafer, The Regulation of International Banking, 11 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & CoM. REG. 475 (1986). Connie M. Friesen, in an examination of current
regulatory practices world-wide, notes "the ad hoc nature of current regulatory and
supervisory procedures and the lack of full agreement on objectives among bank
regulatory and supervisory agencies." Friesen, The Regulation and Supervision of
International Bank Lending: Part I, 19 INT'L LAW. 1059, 1062 (1985).
4 Hackney & Shafer, supra note 3, at 495.
461
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
The Cooke Committee, a committee of central bankers from the
industrialized countries, is the only forum that attempts to globally
coordinate bank regulation.' This extralegal body has been "severely
limited" in its effectiveness since it must rely on the voluntary com-
pliance of its members and their respective governments with informal
and broadly drawn guidelines. 6
An independent transnational institution designed to regulate in-
ternational banking would be ideal; 7 however, its creation would
require national regulatory institutions to cede a considerable amount
of power for the greater global good. Due to these institutions'
resistance to relinquishing their power, legally controlling agreements
regulating transnational banking operations are "the exception rather
than the rule.''8 Thus, creating a transnational institution appears
politically unfeasible.
Nevertheless, the debt crisis in the developing countries has high-
lighted the need for an effective global framework for regulating
international banking. While the debt crisis was precipitated by ad-
, In 1974, the Bank for International Settlements created the Committee on
Bank Regulations and Supervisory Practices, a standing committee of bank super-
visors from the Group of Ten countries plus Luxembourg and Switzerland. The
committee is commonly called the Cooke Committee, after the name of its chairman,
Peter Cooke of the Bank of England. The purpose of the Committee is to provide
a regular forum for closer international cooperation on banking supervisory matters
and to work towards improving the cohesion of arrangements for supervising the
activities of banks operating in international markets. See G.G. JOHNSON & R.K.
ABRAMs, ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SAFETY NET 25-26 (1983) (Oc-
casional Papers of the Int'l Monetary Fund No. 17).
6 International Bank Lending: Hearings Before The Subcomm. On Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance Of The House Comm. On Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st. Sess., 17 (1983) [hereinafter
Hearings] (Statement by Richard S. Dale).
7 In a paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference
on Less Developed Country (LDC) Finance, LDC Finance - The Role of Bank
Supervisory Policies, New York, May 6-9, 1984, at I, Paul Cooke asked whether
the current debt crisis "may not point increasingly toward a need for a single global
regulatory framework within which the banks should conduct their international
business." Quoted in Friesen, supra note 3, at 1062. Other commentators have noted
that "because an interdependent multinational banking system with its mutual vul-
nerability is now a reality .... both banks and bank supervisors have a real incentive
to develop uniform, or at least harmonized, rules of the game." Bench & Sable,
International Lending Supervision, 11 N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 427, 433 (1986).
8 Bench & Sable, supra note 7, at 429. Others assert that with the exception of
the EEC Contact Group, no single organization has sufficient authority to enforce
compliance with mutually agreed upon principles. Hackney & Shafer, supra note 3,
at 493.
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verse economic conditions in the early 1980's, 9 it was fundamentally
the result of inadequate bank regulation. Bank regulators in the
industrial countries actually encouraged massive private lending to
developing countries because the resulting increase in developing coun-
try spending stimulated the industrial economies. 10 When it became
apparent that the developing countries would soon be unable to service
their debt," bank regulators were unable to prevent commercial banks
from abruptly cutting off credit to developing countries, thus causing
the very debt crisis the bankers had feared. 12
Since private lending is necessary to revitalize economic develop-
ment in developing countries,'3 a debt strategy must foster such lending
to developing countries within reasonable, sustainable limits. To ac-
complish this objective, this Note proposes a market-based debt strat-
egy that is comprehensive, globally uniform, and responsive to the
changing conditions in debtor countries.' 4
The Background section explains the interrelationships between-the
four principal groups involved in the debt crisis: the major creditors
(a few large commercial banks), the major debtors (a few advanced
developing countries), 5 international financial organizations (the In-
9 See infra notes 57-74 and accompanying text for an explanation of these
conditions.
10 The lending stimulated demand for industrialized country exports which mod-
erated the negative effects of the first oil shock on the industrialized economies.
See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
1 The service of debt refers to the periodic payments that the debtor is con-
tractually bound to pay the lender. During the first few years of a long-term debt
this payment consists mostly of interest.
12 See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
1 The regulation of private lending to developing countries need not take the
form of rules and guidelines administered by a coalition of central bankers like the
Cooke Committee or an international organization like the World Bank or the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). In fact, this approach has proven to be in-
effective. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. Government policies in the
past have often encouraged misdirected lending patterns. Often, large capital-intensive
industrial projects were promoted while agricultural development suffered. Friesen,
supra note 3, at 1062.
11 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1988, at 13, [hereinafter
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. The World Bank defines highly indebted countries
as "countries [that] have encountered severe debt servicing difficulties." Id. at xi.
Currently, seventeen countries fit this description: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria,
Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. In 1982, however, when
the debt crisis surfaced, "just four advanced developing countries - Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina and South Korea - [accounted] for more than half of the total outstanding
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ternational Monetary 'Fund (IMF) and the World Bank), and the
United States government. 16 The Background section is divided into
five subsections which explain: (1) the need for foreign capital in
developing countries and three alternative forms of capital transfer;
(2) the economic, political, and social pressures of the mid-1970's
that caused developing countries to rely almost exclusively on com-
mercial bank loans for their capital requirements; (3) the economic
and regulatory causes of the debt crisis; (4) the initial debt strategy
orchestrated by the commercial banks using the muscle of the IMF;
and (5) an innovative supplemental debt strategy that has recently
been heavily promoted by the commercial banks - the debt-equity
swap.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Alternative Forms of Capital Transfer
The greatest barrier to economic development in the developing
countries is their lack of sufficient amounts of capital. The market-
loans of private banks to non-OPEC developing countries, for some 85 percent of
the net floating-interest debt and almost all of total net private bank 'exposure'
(excluding guaranteed export credits) to non-OPEC developing countries." How
Serious is the Debt Problem of the Developing Countries?, OECD OBSERVER, Jan.
1983, at 15 [hereinafter OECD OBSERVER]. These four advanced developing countries
all have ample agricultural, mineral, and human resources, but only South Korea
has been able to avoid significant problems in servicing its debt. Amuzegar, Dealing
With Debt, FOREIGN POLiCY, Fall 1987, at 152.
Poorer, commodity-dependent countries have incurred mainly official debt (official
Development Assistance and officially extended guaranteed export credits) in minor
amounts. OECD OBSERVER at 15. A default by one of these poorer developing
countries would have a minor effect on the international banking system.
i6 While the U.S. government has always exerted a substantial influence in de-
veloping country debt negotiations (due to the fact that the largest holders of
developing country debt are U.S. commercial banks), the U.S. government formerly
protected its interests from behind the scenes through the World Bank and the IMF.
Over the last three years, however, the U.S. government appears to have adopted
a more public role in these debt negotiations. Treasury Secretary James Baker
announced his "Program for Sustained Growth" at the annual World Bank-IMF
meeting in the fall of 1985, infra note 95, added his "Menu of Options" in 1987,
infra note 96, and lent his support to Brazil's debt proposal in the summer of 1987,
infra note 138. Most significantly, at the end of December, 1987, the U.S. Treasury
agreed to sell up to $10 million worth of 20-year, zero-coupon bonds to Mexico
for $2 billion to secure a corresponding $10 billion Mexican bond issue used in
debt-for-bonds swaps. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
Japan, which has recently emerged as the industrialized country with the largest
capital reserves, has also taken a more active role as it becomes increasingly involved
in lending to developing countries. For a discussion of Japan's new role in debt
negotiations and as a source of capital for the developing countries, see Christ. Sci.
Monitor, Feb. 26, 1988, at 12, col. 1; Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1987, at 31, col. 2.
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based industrialized economies have accumulated capital over a long
period of time through private savings and investment. The non-
market industrialized economies have accumulated capital quickly
through government mandated savings and investment. In the de-
veloping countries, however, little savings and investment can occur
since the basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter have not been
met. 7
With little capital accumulation possible, developing countries must
obtain capital from the capital-rich industrialized countries in one of
three ways: through foreign aid, direct foreign investment, 18 or public
and private financing. The more advanced developing countries find
foreign aid of limited use because their capital requirements are much
greater than the amounts available.' 9 Thus, most capital is obtained
through direct foreign investment and public and private financing.
Despite many advantages direct foreign investment holds over fi-
nancing for the purposes of economic development, 20 most developing
1 To compound the problem, when money does become available, "capital flight"
frequently occurs, as earnings from domestic sales or exports are invested abroad,
often in the industrialized countries. This occurs when the expected returns from
holding money abroad are higher or safer than at home. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT, supra note 15, at 65-67.
"1 Direct foreign investment is investment by "non-residents in enterprises in
which they or other non-residents exercise significant managerial control. .. ." WoRL
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 296. Direct foreign investment in developing
countries should be distinguished from indirect, or portfolio investment, which
involves purchasing investments in foreign securities markets. Not even the more
advanced developing countries attract much foreign investment in their local securities
markets. For recent information on the level of foreign investment in developing
countries, see Shihata, Factors Influencing the Flow of Foreign Investment and the
Relevance of a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Scheme, 21 INT'L LAW. 671 (1987).
19 Thus, foreign aid is generally reserved for the poorest countries and often has
political strings attached. Grants-in-aid or below-market-rate loans are often provided
to developing countries with the stipulation that the money be spent purchasing
products and services from the donor country. See Fishlow, Latin America's Debt,
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Spr. 1982, at 37.
- Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Vice President and General Counsel for the World Bank
aild Secretary-General of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, has concisely summarized the advantages of direct foreign investment:
First, direct investment does not simply provide funds, but an integrated
package of financial resources, managerial skills, technical knowledge, and
marketing connections. Second, it is not a debt creating instrument. The
investor bears the risks of project failure, while a lender has the right to
be repaid regardless of how effectively the borrowed funds were used.
Third, other indirect but important attributes of this form of capital relate
to benefits that ensue from the introduction of efficient and internationally
competitive enterprises into the local economy. In the long run, direct
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countries in the 1960's and 1970's refused to embrace the former
vehicle. 2' Latin American countries in particular regarded direct for-
eign investment as a type of commercial imperialism. The developing
countries argued that the foreign investor's strong bargaining position12
forced local governments to make too many concessions, thus enabling
foreign investors to obtain an unfair advantage over national investors
and hindering the countries' efforts to establish an independent in-
dustrial base. 23 To prevent foreign control over important sectors of
their economies, developing countries adopted highly restrictive in-
vestment regulations24 and nationalized many foreign-owned indus-
tries .25
foreign investment can foster a general improvement in production by
stimulating the adoption of improved techniques and management in other
sectors of the economy, and among local entrepreneurs. Fourth, foreign
investment often works as a catalyst for associated lending for specific
projects, thus increasing the overall availability of external resources for
productive purposes. Also, foreign investors often act as lobbyists in their
home countries for the benefit of their projects in developing countries.
Shihata, supra note 18, at 675.
21 However, the 1980's has witnessed a "fundamental change of attitude from
the previous two decades .... As a result, a great number of developing countries
are now competing to promote foreign investment ... ." Shihata, supra note 18, at
676.
Generally, foreign investors have great flexibility as to which country they will
invest in. This gives them a strong bargaining position, as one country competes
against another to attract the investors.
23 This is the basis of the dependency theory, or dependencia as it is popularly
called in Latin America. Developed by Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer and promoted
by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in the
1950's, the dependency theory challenged the neo-classical economic theory that
international free trade benefited all participants. Prebisch and Singer saw the current
trade structure as perpetuating underdevelopment. They argued that only the in-
dustrialized countries benefited from trade because the developing countries only
produced and exported raw materials and were subject to deteriorating terms of
trade vis-a-vis the industrialized countries. The dependency theorists argued that
industrialization was necessary to equalize conditions. To speed up the process the
ECLA advocated import substitution and protection of "infant industries" through
tariffs. The first countries to follow ECLA strategy were Argentina, Brazil, Columbia,
and Peru. R. PREBISCH, CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT - LATIN AMERICA'S GREAT
TASK (1971); see generally M. BLOMSTRAAM & B. HETTNE, DEVELOPMENT THEORY
in TRANSION 38-44 (1984). For an analysis of the dependency theory see Jova,
Private Investment in Latin America: Renegotiating the Bargain, 10 Tnx. INT'L L.
J. 455, 470-473 (1975). For a list of other relevant articles see Shihata, supra note
18, at 676.
24 One example of restrictive investment regulations is the Andean Pact's old
Foreign Investment Code - Decision 24. See Note, The Andean Foreign Investment
Code: An Overview, 7 GA. J. INT'L & CoMip. L. 656 (1977). Decision 24 has now
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Despite developing countries' distrust of direct foreign investment,
in the 1950's and mid-1960's the majority of capital transfer to
developing countries occurred in this form. The commercial banks
considered developing country loans too risky and instead took ad-
vantage of many good lending opportunities which existed within the
industrialized countries themselves .26
B. Financing Economic Development
In a dramatic reversal foreign private lending surpassed direct
foreign investment in the 1970's as the predominant form of capital
transfer to developing countries. From 1976 to 1980, direct foreign
investment amounted to only 20 percent of the total capital flowing
into developing countries. 27 The greater amount of this capital inflow
came as loans from private sources. 2 Starting in 1973, commercial
banks assumed a progressively larger role in the lending. 29 A number
of factors, both regulatory and economic, motivated the commercial
banks to change their traditionally conservative lending policy with
respect to the advanced developing countries.
It was the oil shock in 1973 that prompted commercial banks to
make large loans to developing countries. The Organization of Pe-
been replaced by Decision 220, which is more favorable to foreign investment. See
infra note 112.
21 Shihata, supra note 18, at 676. Many of these state-owned corporations are
now being "privatized", i.e. the governments are selling the corporations back to
private investors. Many of these transactions are being accomplished through debt-
equity swaps. Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1987, at 29, col. 1. See infra notes 94-107 and
accompanying text.
Although Latin American governments began applying for loans in the 1950's,
few were granted during this earlier period. Fishlow, supra note 19, at 37. Commercial
banks considered developing countries too great a risk compared to alternative
borrowers within the industrialized countries. Instead, Latin America obtained most
of its foreign capital in the early 1960's from the U.S. government in the form of
loans and grants under the Alliance for Progress. Id., at 36.
Mexico was the exception; because of its proximity to the United States, it was
deemed creditworthy and received commercial loans earlier. Consequently, Mexico
had its first debt crisis in 1975, much sooner than any other developing country,
though the discovery of oil deposits in Mexico relieved much of its debt pressure
at that time. Id.
27 Id. Between 1974 and 1977, the external debt of developing countries is estimated
to have doubled in real terms - from $113 to $231 billion. See Carvounis, The
LDC Debt Problem, COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus., Spr. 1982, at 16. At the same
time, bank lending to the developing countries increased more rapidly than official
aid, because commercial loans were cheap and relatively free of onerous restrictions.
See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, at 27-29.
28 Id.
29 Fishlow, supra note 19, at 36. See also Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 141.
1988]
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
troleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) earned much of its revenue in
U.S. dollars, which were deposited in large U.S. commercial banks,
or deposited abroad as Eurodollars.3 ° These large, dollar-denominated
deposits called "petrodollars" created excess reserves in the com-
mercial banks. Pressured by the need to find new borrowers for these
excess reserves, the banks in 1973 relaxed their lending standards and
extended more credit to developing countries.
The oil shock and the resulting surplus of petrodollars also greatly
reduced money supplies in oil-importing industrialized countries. The
reduced money supplies in turn threatened to increase the severity of
the "stagflation" 31 plaguing these countries. The petrodollars needed
to be "recycled" back into the world economy. 32 Since stagflation
had eliminated most good investment opportunities in the Western
economies, the developing countries were the natural alternative for
investors. 33 The developing countries used the borrowed petrodollars
to purchase Western goods and services needed for economic devel-
opment, thus stimulating demand for Western exports and minimizing
the impact of the first oil shock on the economies of the oil-importing
industrialized countries . 4
Despite its new authority over commercial banks under the Bank
Holding Company Act, a5 the United States Federal Reserve did noth-
ing to discourage the massive petrodollar loans U.S. banks were
making to developing countries.3 6 Additionally, central bankers agreed
30 Eurodollars are dollar denominated deposits at commercial banks outside the
United States.
1, Stagflation is a situation in which an economy is experiencing both substantial
inflation and a slow growth in output. Under these conditions few good investment
opportunities exist.
32 "At the international level, there was no choice: the oil country surpluses had
to be financed or global income would fall." Fishlow, supra note 19, at 36. See
also Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 141.
51 See Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 141.
34 See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 14.
1, The U.S. Bank Holding Company Act as amended in 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-
1850 (1982); 26 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1103 (1982), effectively placed all U.S. banks ex-
tensively engaged in international lending under the regulatory arm of the Federal
Reserve. See Folkerts-Landau, The Regulatory Origins of the International Debt
Crisis, THE BANKERS MAGAZINE, Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 49.
36 One commentator blames the Federal Reserve for allowing the excessive lending:
More importantly, the Federal Reserve did not discourage U.S. banks from
assuming a loan exposure to non-OPEC developing countries that came to
exceed $103 billion by the end of 1982. Given that it was the Federal
Reserve that regulated the operations of bank holding companies, including
all money center banks, those banks had good cause for complying with
the Federal Reserve's wishes.
Folkerts-Landau, supra note 35, at 49.
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in effect, through the international forum of the Cooke Committee,
to cooperate in internationally-oriented lender of last resort opera-
tions, thus reducing the commercial banks' loan exposure risk.37 The
banks were given the impression that if the developing countries failed
to service their debt to any great degree, the central banks of the
industrialized countries would make up any deficiencies. 8
In addition to pressuring banks and bank regulators to allow more
developing country loans, the 1973 oil shock increased the developing
countries' demand for dollars. When oil prices rose, the oil-importing
developing countries experienced trade deficits, as the cost of their
imports exceeded their export income. Concurrently, the oil shock
caused a recession in the industrialized countries which indirectly
increased developing country trade deficits by reducing demand for
developing country exports. 9 The trade deficits soon translated into
balance of payments (BOP) deficits, and the funds used to finance
these payments deficits were diverted from capital formation, which
in turn threatened to slow development. 4° The developing countries
had to either restrict spending and thereby slow economic develop-
ment, or find means to finance the BOP deficits.
Private foreign financing seemed the easiest short-term solution for
the developing countries to correct their BOP deficits.4 ' By financing
17 See Folkerts-Landau, supra note 35, at 45. Folkerts-Landau explains how "the
historically low premiums on loans to developing countries in recent years have been
a predictable and rational economic response by banks to the diminishing riskiness
of foreign lending." The reduction in risk is in large part a result of financial
backing by the central banks.
31 This was one of many factors cited by Richard S. Dale that "blunted" market
restraints on risk-taking for private lending institutions. See SEC and Citicorp:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm.
On Energy and Commerce, 97th Congress, 1st Sess., 199-208. (1982). Normally, if
a bank has too great a loan exposure, the price of the bank's stock will decrease
and act as a market restraint. Several instances where the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) paid off 100 percent of failing bank's deposits also contributed
to this false sense of security felt by U.S. banks. See Folkerts-Landau, supra note
35, at 49.
19 See Carvounis, supra note 27, at 17.
4o Id.
41 The developing countries' alternatives to borrowing were not as attractive. For
example, they could have used less oil by encouraging conservation, imported less
of other products, or expanded exports - all of which would have improved their
trade deficit. These measures were generally not adopted until after the debt crisis
materialized. Fishlow, supra note 19, at 36. The easy credit terms available to the
developing countries in the 1970's encouraged the debtors to overspend. Amuzegar,
supra note 15, at 142.
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the BOP deficits instead of reducing spending on imports, the de-
veloping countries could continue their development programs at a
rapid pace. 42 The real interest rates on many of these foreign loans
incurred to finance the BOP deficits were actually negative, 43 due
partially to the competition between banks for the borrowers. 44
Since private commercial banks were encouraged to lend, and the
developing countries were eager to borrow, the banks extended sub-
stantial credit to the developing countries for the first time. The
recycling of oil revenues in the form of loans to developing countries
proceeded at a furious pace. The petrodollar loans were used to
finance capital formation, oil imports, and new state enterprises.
Large commercial banks in the United States were the principal
lenders, 45 and the advanced developing countries received the majority
of the loans.4 Having more diversified economies that could more
easily generate the foreign exchange necessary to service their debt,
the advanced developing countries presented less risk. Additionally,
these countries imported much more oil, and so required more loans.47
Most loans were made to or guaranteed by the governments, the
banks perceiving this as a means of underwriting the risk. 48
42 Fishlow, supra note 19, at 36.
41 An interest rate on a loan is negative when the inflation rate is greater than
the interest rate charged on the loan:
Given the double-digit inflation levels in almost every oil-consuming country
at the time and the expectation that inflation would continue, [the 8.5
percent average nominal rate on loans between 1973 and 1979] ... cor-
responded in fact to a negative real rate of minus one percent or less. In
1975, real rates fell as low as -4 percent, according to estimates by the
World Bank. Borrowing therefore turned into a very attractive activity.
Folkerts-Landau, supra note 35, at 47. The commercial banks did, however, insist
on floating interest rates. Thus, when market interest rates rose in the early 1980's,
the negative interest rates disappeared.
" OECD OBSERVER, supra note 15, at 13.
41 Highly competitive loan policies adopted by the largest commercial banks from
1976 to 1979, among them Citibank, Bank of America, and Chase Manhattan,
concentrated the lending volume among a comparatively small group of banks. See
Carvounis, supra note 27, at 16.
6 The 1982 debt crisis, involved primarily a handful of developing countries
because private banks had avoided lending to the poorest developing countries. Id.
41 In 1973, low-income developing countries imported $6 million worth of oil,
rising to $2.7 billion in 1979 and $3.3 billion in 1980. Concurrently, advanced
developing countries imported $6.1 billion worth of oil in 1973, $40 billion in 1979,
and $54.5 billion in 1980. See Carvounis, supra note 27, at 17.
Not only was public guarantee an important attraction to banks, but "[it
provided] unprecedented access to capital for the state sector . . . underwriting its
expansion." Fishlow, supra note 19, at 37. The belief was that states don't go
bankrupt. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 27-28.
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The commercial banks imposed "hard terms" on the developing
countries compared to the "soft terms" characteristic of official aid.
For example, the private loans typically provided for floating interest
rates 49 and shorter maturities.50 The shorter maturities resulted in part
from the commercial banks' inability to consistently predict the risk
presented by the borrowing countries 8 or 10 years in the future.5'
Additionally, bank regulators actually encouraged the short-term lend-
ing since it allowed commercial banks to have a more flexible liquidity
position.52
Throughout the 1970's, the developing countries serviced their debt
without great difficulty. The value of the U.S. dollar had been
declining," commodity prices were rising,5 4 and real interest rates
were mostly negative.55 Excessive government spending, financed from
abroad, created artificially high growth rates in the developing coun-
tries. Public opinion in developing countries was therefore generally
optimistic and growth-oriented .1 6
C. The Economic and Regulatory Causes of the Debt Crisis
The second oil shock precipitated the debt crisis. In 1979, to
compensate for rising inflation rates, the industrialized countries
adopted severe deflationary measures which resulted in world-wide
recession and high unemployment and interest rates. As the recession
deepened in the industrialized countries, their demand for imports
fell and the developing countries' export volume declined correspond-
49 A floating interest rate is always linked to a variable base rate like the London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) which is itself tied to other key rates such as the
U.S. prime rate. The floating interest rate is equal to the variable base rate plus
the "margin". It is recalculated at fixed intervals (usually every six months). See
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 29 (Figure 1.9).
10 See Carvounis, supra note 27, at 16.
1' See Carvounis, supra note 27, at 17, and Fishlow, supra note 19, at 37.
52 If the industrialized countries in the future required additional funds, the
commercial banks could more easily respond provided that their money was not
tied up in long-term loan commitments. See Freisen, supra note 3, at 1062.
53 With the exchange rate for dollars being low, it cost less to pay off the dollar-
denominated loans.
54 One of the weaknesses of developing country economies is their dependence
on the export of one or two commodities as the principal source of foreign exchange.
With commodity prices rising, the borrowing countries had more foreign currency
to make payments on the loans. However, in the early 1980's, commodity prices
plummeted, severely limiting the developing countries' supplies of foreign exchange.
55 See Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 142.
56 As one commentator explained: "[Clapital inflows readily allowed poorer coun-
tries to maintain or raise their living standards." Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 142.
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ingly. As a result of this decline in exports the developing countries
lost much of the already scarce foreign exchange they needed to
service their debt.
Not only did the demand in the industrialized countries for de-
veloping country products fall as a consequence of the recession, but
the high unemployment rates in industrialized countries spawned pro-
tectionist policies against imports from developing countries.5 7 Ad-
ditionally, subsidies from industrialized countries to their own
producers caused an oversupply in the world commodity markets,
thus driving commodity prices down.5" The developing countries,
generally dependent on commodity exports as their primary source
of foreign exchange, found their ability to service their debt sub-
stantially impaired . 9 The rapid rise in interest rates in the developed
countries compounded the developing countries' debt service diffi-
culties. As the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)6° rose above
15 percent, the floating interest rates on the developing country debt
increased correspondingly.6' Thus, the developing countries faced higher
periodic interest payments at the same time as their supply of foreign
exchange dwindled.
As the recession deepened, the world demand for oil also declined
and the inflated oil prices fell; 62 correspondingly, the banks' supplies
of petrodollars dwindled. 63 The drop in oil prices, instead of helping
oil-importing developing countries meet their debt obligations, pri-
marily affected the ability of oil-exporting developing countries like
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela to service their debt, and
also removed from the banks their primary source of loanable funds.6
17 Carvounis, supra note 27, at 15. The brunt of the industrialized countries'
most severe protectionist policies are directed at the major debtor countries. See
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 16 (Box 1.1).
11 Surplus agricultural products, the result of subsidies in industrialized countries,
are often dumped on world markets, depressing prices. Thus, even though developing
countries are often the more efficient producers of agricultural products, they end
up losing sales. The EEC, Japan, the Nordic countries, and Austria subsidize their
exports the most. See chart in OECD OBSERVER, Aug.-Sept. 1987, at 7.
19 Most developing countries depend primarily on one or two commodities for
their export income. Thus, if commodity prices are depressed, the countries' major
source of foreign exchange is severely diminished.
60 See supra note 49.
61 How the Cash Flow Crisis Floored the LDCs, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1982, at 21
[hereinafter EuROMONEY].
62 Petroleum prices fell 15 percent from $34 a barrel in 1982 to $29 a barrel in
1983. Folkerts-Landau, supra note 35, at 47.
63 Id.
6" Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 146.
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As some developing countries experienced increasing difficulty serv-
icing their debt, banks cut credit with an abruptness that precipitated
the very liquidity crisis that the banks had feared. 6 Long- and me-
dium-term lending to developing countries slowed dramatically, 6
dropping from $47 billion in 1981 to $25 billion in 1982.67 Only
short-term loans at high, floating interest rates were available.68 In
1983, with the lending virtually stopped and the developing countries
on the brink of default, the debt crisis had arrived. 69
Both the debtors and the creditors have attempted to avoid the
blame for the debt crisis. 70 Debtors blame the world-wide recession,
low commodity prices, protectionist policies in industrialized coun-
tries, high import prices, record high interest rates, and the sudden
cancellation of credit by the commercial banks - all significant
factors beyond the control of the debtor nations. 71 Creditors, while
acknowledging the significance of some of these factors, place most
of the blame on the debtor governments' undisciplined domestic
policies, 72 capital flight, 73 and corruption. The World Bank's expla-
63 The debt crisis at first was described as a cash flow problem, i.e. a liquidity
crisis. The developing country investments were not generating enough foreign ex-
change through increased imports to service the debt. By cutting credit suddenly to
the developing countries, the banks made this cash flow problem much worse. See
Fishlow, supra note 19, at 41.
66Medium-term debt increased 20 percent per year from 1970 to 1979 then slowed
to 15 percent in 1980 and 1981. EURmooNEY, supra note 61, at 23. By 1982 there
was a net cash outflow from the developing countries. Id. at 29.
617 Folkerts-Landau, supra note 35, at 47.
68 In Latin America at the beginning of 1981, short-term borrowing was already
41 percent of the total and by the end of the year the proportion had risen to 66
percent. EURoMoN-Y, supra note 61, at 21.
6 Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 142. Looking back at the massive borrowing that
occurred in Latin America, commentators have noted: "It is ironic that most countries
in Latin America strongly preferred bank loans to foreign equity investment in the
1970's, in pursuit of greater independence from foreign influence, yet would have
suffered much less disruption had they chosen the opposite course." B. Balassa, G.
Bueno, P. Kuczynski, & M. Simonsen, Toward Renewed Economic Growth in Latin
America, INST. FOR INT'L ECON., at 28 (1986).
70 See Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 143.
1, Id. at 142. See also Carvounis, supra note 27, at 15.
72 Not all developing country officials dispute the claim that their policies con-
tributed to the problem. For example, Adrian Lajous, former head of the Mexican
Central Bank, concedes that Mexico's borrowing during the 1970's was irresponsible.
See Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1987, at 21, col. 3.
However, some offer a strong rebuttal to the creditors' charges:
While better policies by borrowers would doubtless have made a difference,
it is striking that nearly all countries which borrowed commercially are in
a similar situation - their debt service exceeds 50 percent of exports and
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nation appears closer to the mark; it finds debt-servicing difficulties
to have been caused by a combination of poor domestic policies and
a deteriorating world environment. 74
While the 1982 debt crisis is generally attributed to these two
aggregate factors, on a more fundamental level, a substantial share
of the blame belongs to the regulatory practices of creditors' gov-
ernments. These governments' bank regulatory agencies paid little
attention to the risks in most of the loans being made to developing
countries, focusing instead on encouraging the recycling of petro-
dollars. 75 Paul A. Volker, former Chairman of the U.S. Federal
Reserve, explained to Congress that in the United States, "bank
examiners were not equipped to evaluate economic conditions and
prospects of countries. There was a high degree of variability in the
way country lending was handled in examination reports." ' 76 On the
they are unable to meet contractual obligations. This is true both of countries
with elected civilian governments and those with military governments. It
is true of right-wing, free-market economies, of centrist, statist economies
and of socialist economies. It is true of large countries and small countries,
of oil exporters and oil importers, of countries long praised for the high
quality of their public administration and of countries long criticized for
their low level of management.
Weinert, Coping With LDC Debt, 38 J. INT'L ArrAms 1 (1984). Significantly, only
developing countries on the Pacific Rim, most notably South Korea and Taiwan,
have managed to avoid debt problems. See Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 152.
11 It is estimated that $80 to $100 billion fled Latin America after 1974. Even
some of the money borrowed from commercial banks left the developing countries.
"Overvalued exchange rates, themselves made possible by the borrowing, made such
flight attractive." Kuczynski, The Outlook for Latin American Debt, FoREIGN AF-
FAIRS, Fail 1987, at 129, 143.
1, See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 13-14. "The debate about
whether economic mismanagement by borrowers, imprudent lending by banks or
exogenous shocks was primarily responsible for the debt crisis is sterile. All three
factors contributed, and it really does not make much difference how the blame is
allocated." Weinert, supra note 72, at 1.
71 Elinor G. Constable, Deputy Asst. Secty. For Econ. and Bus. Affairs, Dept.
of State, stated:
For industrialized and developing oil-importing countries alike, the appro-
priate policy response to [the first oil shock and inflation] would have been
a combination of fiscal and monetary restraint .... [U.S.] policy did not
focus on the need to adjust. Rather, our primary concern was the en-
couragement of efficient "recycling" of the OPEC surpluses. ...
Hearings, supra note 6, at 57-58.
There is general agreement today that the large commercial banks did not ade-
quately account for sovereign risk in debtor countries, and consequently overexposed
themselves. See Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 143.
76 International Financial Markets and Related Problems: Hearings Before the
House Comm. On Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 52
(1983) [hereinafter Banking Commission Hearings].
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international level, the Cooke Committee essentially assumed a lender-
of-last-resort function, thereby removing normal market restraints on
risk-taking in international banking." Consequently, a commercial
bank could maintain high levels of loan exposure without adversely
affecting its balance sheet, volume of deposits, or the price of its
stock.
71
D. The Containment Strategy
The danger of widespread defaults by major debtors in 1982 sud-
denly brought home the fact that the commercial banks were dan-
gerously overexposed. Public confidence had to be quickly restored
in order to avoid a collapse of the international banking system.7 9
77 Folkerts-Landau, supra note 35, at 45.
71 Recognizing the need to strengthen the regulation of U.S. banks' international
lending, the Comptroller's Office, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) formed the Interagency Country Exposure Review
Committee (ICERC) in 1979. See Bench & Sable, supra note 7, at 434. The ICERC
implemented a four-part country risk examination system: (1) a statistical reporting
system designed to identify country exposures at each bank; (2) an evaluation of
each bank's internal system for managing country risk; (3) a series of classifications
'for sovereign debt not serviced in a timely manner ("substandard", "value impaired",
or a "total loss") which may trigger an obligation by the bank to set aside pre-
cautionary loan-loss reserves; and (4) a bank examiner review of each bank's large
foreign lending exposures. See id., at 435-439. The procedures emphasize diversi-
fication as the best measure of protection for banks in their international lending.
Banking Commission Hearings, supra note 76, at 7 (letter from Paul A. Volker,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve).
Special loan-loss reserves are required when -debt is classified as value impaired.
The threat of mandatory increases in reserves .(which cut deeply into bank profits)
puts additional pressure on banks and their borrowers to resolve debt problems.
For example, Brazil paid 3 months of debt service in the fall of 1987 to avoid
having its debt classified as value impaired and to gain additional time for negotiations
with its creditors.
Charles Bowsher, the Comptroller General, admitted, however, that the country
risk examination system has three inherent limitations: bank regulations cannot solve
worldwide economic problems; events that affect country risk can develop very
quickly with little advanced warning; and bank regulations cannot replace good bank
management. Hearings, supra note 6, at 16. Moreover, Mr. Bowsher felt that the
system's objectives were not being clearly communicated to bankers. Id. at 18. He
noted also that since its implementation in 1979, the system has had no demonstratable
impact in restraining the growth in bank lending to countries with potential payment
problems. Id.
Congress has responded by enacting the International Lending Supervision Act of
1983, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-12 (Supp. II 1984)(ILSA), which directs the federal agencies
to strengthen their supervision of U.S. banks' international lending. For an analysis
of the ILSA, see Bench & Sable, supra note 7, at 429.
79 See Kuczynski, supra note 73, at 130. The banks were in a precarious position:
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With this objective, commercial bankers attempted to characterize
the debt crisis as a simple short-term cash flow problem of the
developing countries, a liquidity crisis that would be solved in the
long-run through growth. 0 This was the basic premise of the con-
tainment strategy adopted by the commercial banks and supported
by the U.S. Treasury.
The containment strategy sought to enable the major debtor coun-
tries to continue servicing their debt through rescheduling, adjustment,
and additional financing. Rescheduling involves lengthening loan ma-
turities to postpone principal payments and lower debt service amounts;
unfortunately, interest rates were still allowed to float, and this
dramatically increased a rescheduled loan's total interest component.
Adjustment involves reducing imports and spending, and curtailing
credit, politically precarious moves in developing countries which had
only just begun to raise standards of living. To force the debtor
countries to implement strict adjustment measures, the lending banks
required each debtor country to sign a loan agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a precondition to rescheduling
or additional financing.8 '
"[L]arge private banks typically held Latin American debt equal to two to three
times their capital. To register a loss of even 25 percent of their portfolio would
imply wiping out one half to three-fourths of their capital. This was clearly im-
possible." Weinert, Swapping Third World Debt, FOREIGN POLICY, Winter 1986-87,
at 87. If any bank broke the alliance of the major third world creditors by dumping
its debt, i.e. selling it for less than face value, it would be an admission that the
banks' assets were overvalued. See id.
10 See EuRmoMoNEY, supra note 613, at 25. The banks adopted the dangerous
strategy of financing long-term investments with short-term debt. The interest pay-
ments created a "snowball effect" that plagued the developing countries, as not
enough foreign exchange could be generated in the short-run to meet rising debt
service obligations. The commercial bankers argued, however, that in the long-run
past capital inflows from the loans of the mid-1970's would stimulate production
and exports enough to increase the debtor nations' supplies of foreign exchange.
See Carvounis, supra note 27, at 16.
Today, it is apparent that the debt crisis represents a problem of the long-term
solvency of developing countries. The snowball effect cannot be avoided so easily:
"As available loan terms stiffen, these countries must borrow a greater and greater
portion of their debt on hard terms which of course compounds the total amount
of debt which must be remitted in the future and adds to the growth of deficits."
Id. In 1982, a one percent change in nominal interest rates could increase Latin
American debt service costs by almost one billion dollars. In 1981, when interest
rates jumped, Latin American net payments of interest and profits increased by $6
billion over 1980. See Fishlow, supra note 19, at 37.
81 The banks considered IMF loan agreements with developing countries crucial
to the success of the containment strategy. IMF involvement enabled the banks to
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Over the next three years, the containment strategy postponed any
large-scale defaults. Between 1982 and 1985, more than $140 billion
in short- and medium-term loans for some 30 countries were res-
cheduled.8 2 Additionally, the IMF extended $31 billion in new loans
to 72 developing countries, and private banks extended another $27
billion, 3 these private loans being primarily "involuntary loans" made
to enable debtors to continue servicing the existing debt. Fortunately,
interest rates fell back down to normal levels,8 4 and this combination
of adjustment, rescheduling, and declining interest rates brought the
developing countries' total BOP deficit down from $110 billion in
1982 to $44 billion in 1985. In addition, the developing countries'
1982 trade deficit of $50 million rose to a $7 billion trade surplus
by 1985.5
However, the containment strategy was not without its costs. The
austerity measures imposed under the IMF agreements demanded
sharp cuts in imports by developing countries, which in turn reduced
the export income of industrialized countries.8 6 The severe spending
cuts in developing countries mandated by these austerity measures
caused recessions in these countries which further stalled develop-
ment. 7 Both agricultural and industrial sectors depended upon capital
equipment imported from industrialized countries, 8 and spending cuts
forced these sectors to operate less efficiently or cease operating
altogether. Gross national product growth in developing countries fell
to about 2 percent in the 1980's from an average of 3 percent in the
force developing countries into severe deflationary adjustments by withholding funds
unless the debtor countries complied with the terms of the adjustment agreement.
IMF involvement restores the international banking community's confidence that the
debtor nation will remain solvent. See Don't Call the IMF: It's Running Out of
Quotas, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1982, at 51, 52.
82 See Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 144.
83 Id. at 143.
"Id. at 144.
'5 Id. at 146. While drastic cuts in imports created much of the trade surplus;
high rates of spending in the U.S. also contributed as the demand for inexpensive
third world goods increased. The shift in U.S. trade balances with Latin American
debtors accounts for over one third of America's annual trade deficit. Id.
16 In 1980, 40 percent of U.S. export income came from sales to developing
countries. The $21 billion drop in the U.S. trade balance in the 1980's is nearly
equal to the drop in demand for U.S. products in Latin American countries alone.
Weinert, supra note 72, at 1-2.
87 For a general discussion of the effects of adjustment on the developing countries
see Kuczynski, supra note 73, at 130.
88 See Weinert, supra note 72, at 3.
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1970's and 5 percent in the 1960's.89 Unemployment levels rose and
governments cut social services. 90
Through these effects, the containment strategy only made the debt
crisis more difficult to solve. The strategy operated on the false
premise that the debt crisis was merely a short-term cash flow problem
rather than a long-term problem of the solvency of the debtor coun-
tries. Under the strategy, the debtor countries' supplies of foreign
exchange never increased, 9' and rescheduling never reduced the interest
burden on their loans. The strategy served only the limited purpose
of buying the time necessary for banks to reduce their exposure by
either building up reserves or selling off loans.92 In the interim, the
overall debt of the developing world has continued to grow, surpassing
the $1 trillion mark in 1987. 91
When Citicorp, the world's largest lender to the developing coun-
tries, announced in May 1987 that it would set aside $3 billion in
additional loan-loss reserves, it marked the death of the containment
strategy. The $3 billion reserve, approximately one quarter of Citi-
corp's debt holdings, amounted to an implicit admission that the debt
crisis presented a problem of the long-term solvency in debtor nations,
and that at least part of the debt will never be repaid.
E. The Debt-Equity Swap
At a time when the extension of credit to the developing countries
is dwindling, 94 debtor nations and creditor banks are increasingly
turning to alternative approaches to manage the debt crisis.95 In the
89 Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 145. Seven Latin American countries that main-
tained strong trade surpluses in 1982 and 1983 experienced gross domestic product
growth of minus 0.9 percent in 1982 and 3.9 percent in 1983. Weinert, supra note
72, at 3.
90 Kuczynski, supra note 73, at 130.
9' While developing country export volume has risen substantially since 1982,
commodity prices remain depressed due to chronic oversupply. See WORLD DEVEL-
OPMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 24-25.
92 In 1986 alone, banks sold $8 billion of Latin American debt on the secondary
market. See generally Weinert, supra note 79, at 85.
93 Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 141.
94 It took 6 months to raise $7.7 billion for Mexico's recent restructuring. Wall
St. J., June 11, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
95 Two of the most popular alternative debt strategies are the Baker Plan and
the Bradley Plan. At the annual fall meeting of the IMF and World Bank in 1985,
U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker announced his "Program for Sustained Growth".
See 25 I.L.M. 412 (1986). The Baker Plan called for additional economic reforms
in the developing countries to improve efficiency and stimulate growth. If developing
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summer of 1987, United States Treasury Secretary James Baker of-
fered a "Menu of Options" from which debtors and creditors could
choose. 96 Of the options suggested, only the debt-equity swap has
received significant attention from both creditors and debtors.
In essence, the debt-equity swap allows a commercial bank to credit
a portion of a developing country's debt if the developing country
allows in a like amount of direct foreign investment. 97 For example,
countries adopted such reforms, banks would then be asked to make $20 billion in
new loans over a 3-year period, and the World Bank another $9 billion. Unlike the
containment strategy, the Baker plan recognized that additional capital inflows were
needed to generate sustained growth in the developing countries, and that austerity
measures by themselves were ineffective. See Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 147.
The Baker Plan, however, has itself proved to be ineffective. Commercial banks
continue to avoid making any additional new loan commitments. See American
Banker, Sept. 25, 1987, at 11, col. 1. The $20 billion target for new private loans
will probably never be met. Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 147. The Baker Plan has
been criticized by both creditors and debtors alike. Commercial banks argue that
any new loans will merely add to the debt burden and increase the banks' exposure.
The Group of 24, on the other hand, representing 130 developing countries, argues
that even more loans are needed since the debt cannot be serviced without restoring
economic growth. In addition, they suggest interest relief on old debt, and repayment
schedules tied to export earnings. See 25 I.L.M. 450 (1986).
U.S. Senator Bill Bradley (D-New Jersey) in June, 1986 suggested an alternative
strategy that represents a compromise between creditors and debtors. Like the Baker
Plan, the Bradley Plan tied $9 billion of new World Bank loans to economic reforms
in the developing countries. Unlike the Baker Plan, however, the Bradley Plan does
not require new commercial bank loans, calling instead for selective interest rate
relief designed to reduce the debt service burden. Ultimately, the interest rate relief
would provide more debt relief to the developing countries than the Baker plan.
The Bradley Plan provided for $57 billion in debt relief by cutting 3 percentage
points off the interest rates of all outstanding private and public debts of 15 debtors
for 3 years, and a 3 percent write-down of the loan principal each year for 3 years.
See Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 148-49.
Unfortunately, though earning the support of the developing countries, the Bradley
plan has drawn little support in Congress. Since the plan requires banks to absorb
losses from lost interest income, it has been labeled "radical". See Wall St. J.,
Sept. 10, 1987, at 32, col. 1. Critics argue that these losses would only be shifted
onto taxpayers. Senator Bradley, however, counters that without interest rate relief,
additional involuntary loans will be needed to enable debtor nations to continue
servicing their debt. Such loans fail to provide new capital inflows necessary for
growth and only increase the probability and magnitude of a default. Since the U.S.
government would be forced to bail out the banks if major defaults occurred,
taxpayers would eventually shoulder an even greater burden. See Wall St. J., Sept.
29, 1987, at 39, col. 1.
9 Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1987, at 35, col. 1. For a description of many of the
new financing techniques for developing countries which are included in Baker's
Menus of Options, see Regling, New Financing Approaches in the Debt Strategy,
FiNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, Mar. 1988, at 6.
11 A similar technique, employed in corporate reorganizations, requires the con-
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a creditor bank might sell $1 million (face value) of a developing
country's debt to an intermediary9" at a discount of 20 percent. The
bank credits the debtor country's account $1 million and treats the
20 percent discount as a loss. A foreign investor, interested in making
an investment in the debtor country, buys the discounted debt from
the intermediary at the same price. The intermediary, on behalf of
the foreign investor, presents the canceled debt to the debtor country's
central bank, where it is transformed into an equity investment in
the debtor country with a value close to the face value of the original
loan, with returns to be paid in the local currency. 99 The intermediary
receives a fee from the foreign investor for its brokerage services. I°°
The commercial banks, who are the main promoters of debt-equity
swaps, argue that the swaps benefit all parties involved.' 0' The banks
remove the bad debt from their books, create tradeable securities, 0 2
and the foreign investor receives the benefit of the discount, thereby
version of an overly large corporate debt into shares of stock. The debt-equity ratio
is improved and the interest burden is reduced. See Weinert, supra note 79, at 89.
The well-publicized Chrysler Corporation bailout scheme employed this technique,
and lenders eventually benefited. Id.
98 Often the commercial bank arranges the debt-equity swap, pocketing the large
brokerage fee itself. Citicorp follows this practice. See Marton, The Debate Over
Debt-For-Equity Swaps, INsTITuTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1987, at 178.
" The developing country's central bank negotiates the exchange rate on the debt-
equity swap with the foreign investor. Under the Mexican debt-equity swap agreement,
the central bank forces foreign investors to share half of the discount they received
from the bank by offering a lower exchange rate. See Ollard, The Debt Swappers,
EURmoMoNEY, Aug. 1986, at 67, 69. Thus, in the example, if the foreign investor
wanted to invest in Mexico, the foreign investor would be paid 90 percent of the
$1 million note in Mexican currency.
,00 In another variety of this transaction, the lender bank makes the actual in-
vestment. In August, 1987, the Federal Reserve Board announced a liberalization
of Regulation K which had limited bank ownership of non-financial companies to
20 percent. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)(1988). The revised Regulation K enables banks to
acquire, through their subsidiaries, up to 100 percent of foreign financial and non-
financial companies. See Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1987, at 3, col. 2. The non-financial
companies may only be acquired from a government with a high level of foreign
debt and ownership is limited to a maximum of five years. Id. Additionally, the
non-financial company must be in the process of converting from public to private
ownership. Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1987, at 10, col. 1. According to industry experts,
the new ruling will probably cause banks to broaden their holdings to include
manufacturers and service companies. Id.
101 Recent Development, International Debt: Debt-To-Equity Swaps, 28 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 507, 512 (1987).
, Some critics of debt-equity swaps are quick to point out another benefit realized
by the banks who arrange these swaps: large brokerage fees. The typical fee in 1986
was 1 percent of the face value of the debt swapped. Before swaps became competitive,
the brokerage fee ran as high as 4 percent. Marton, supra note 98, at 178.
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reducing his costs of investment. The banks argue that this encourages
additional investment, thereby increasing the capital transfer to de-
veloping countries while at the same time canceling part of their
debt. 103 Moreover, banks argue, developing countries are provided
with a technique to encourage the repatriation, at no cost to them,
of capital that had left the countries, by allowing a national with
foreign holdings to repatriate his capital at a more favorable exchange
rate. Finally, all of these benefits accrue without diminishing the
developing countries' supply of foreign currency; thus, the banks
argue, preserving the debtors' balance of payments and enhancing
their creditworthiness.
The sudden enthusiasm for swapping debt for equity at a discount
signals a shift in the lender banks' financial positions. Over the past
five years many of these banks have set aside substantial reserves to
cover possible losses on loans to developing countries) °4 The larger
reserves allow banks to sell their debt at a discount in a debt-equity
swap without directly reducing profits as they are reported on their
income statements.10 5
The debt-equity swap arrangement has been an integral part of
most recent rescheduling agreements. °6 Chile, Mexico, the Philippines,
103 Ollard, supra note 99, at 69.
104 The more honest depiction of assets has restored confidence in the banks'
financial health even though it has severely cut into their profits. Despite experiencing
its most unprofitable quarter ever, when Citicorp announced that $3 billion in reserves
would be set aside against loans to developing countries, the price of its stock
increased. Wall St. J., May 20, 1987, at 1, col. 6. Soon after Citicorp added $3
billion to its loan-loss reserves, many of the major commercial banks followed suit:
Chase Manhattan - $1.6 billion, BankAmerica and Chemical Bank - $1.1 billion,
and Manufacturer's Hanover - $1.7 billion. Fifty U.S. banks have reported additions
to loan-loss reserves totaling $16.7 billion and second-quarter net losses totaling
$12.9 billion. Wall St. J., July 20, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
103 The week after Citicorp Chairman John S. Reed announced the increase in
loan-loss reserves, Citicorp announced that it would aggressively pursue debt-equity
swaps. See Wall St. J., May 28, 1987, at 6, col. 1. Richard L. Huber, head of
Citicorp's investment banking division, explained why the debt-equity swap has
suddenly become popular:
For debt-equity swaps to work, there needs to be a liquid market of debt
that can be traded. Until now, most banks haven't been willing to part
with those loans, because to do so would have required taking a loss -
a no-no when it was imperative to maintain the fiction that all that debt
would be repaid. Now that [Citicorp Chairman John S. Reed] has set aside
$3 billion to cushion those losses, and other major banks have followed
suit, that obstacle is gone.
Bartlett, The Citi Squeezes Its Lemons, Bus. WK., June 15, 1987, at 31.
'o Wall St. J., June 11, 1987, at 6, col. 1. See also, Weinert, supra note 79.
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and a few other debtor countries have together exchanged about $10
billion of foreign bank debt in debt-equity swaps. Chile probably
accounts for as much as a third of this total and has reduced its
outstanding debt by around 10 percent. 1°7
III. ANALYsis
A. The Debt-Equity Swap
Critics of debt-equity swaps voice three principal objections to the
practice: first, that hostile attitudes in developing countries towards
foreign investment there limit the swaps' effectiveness; second, that
the debt-equity swap fails to encourage additional investment because
most of the swaps are being completed by investors who already have
interests in the host countries and would make the investments re-
gardless of the discount offered in the swap; I0u and third, that the
repatriation of profits out of the developing countries over the long
run destroys any temporary positive effect on the debtors' balances
of payments.' °9
The belief of some critics that developing countries will inevitably
maintain their traditionally hostile attitude toward foreign investment
seems untenable.'"0 The promotion of debt-equity swaps is much more
than mere "ideological tutelage" by the governments of industrialized
countries as some critics claim."' Admittedly, the success of the debt-
equity swap depends upon the willingness of the host country to
accept foreign investment. However, within the past few years the
governments of most developing countries have adopted new pro-
foreign investment policies, 112 recognizing the danger of assuming too
107 Wall St. J., June II, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
' See Marton, supra note 98, at 177. Rudiger Dornbush of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology asserts that "In nine out of ten swaps, it is one big rip-
off.... The investment would have come in anyway, and with a swap the central
bank is saddled with paying an unnecessary subsidy to provide the local currency."
1d.
101 See Kuttner, Third World Debt: A Flawed Solution, Bus. WK., Jan. 19, 1987,
at 18.
110 N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
"I See, e.g., Kuttner, Third World Debt: A Flawed Solution, Bus. WK., Jan. 19,
1987, at 18.
112 Venezuela is an excellent example of this shift in attitudes. In the 1970's, as
a member of the Andean Pact, it enacted a strict foreign investment code designed
to severely limit foreign access to Venezuelan investments. At the time, Venezuela
could afford to pursue such a policy, as its income from oil exports was good. The
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much external debt. Foreign investment is often the only real alter-
native source of capital available to them. 3 Nevertheless, modifi-
cation of public perceptions within developing countries takes time;
thus, new foreign investors must proceed responsibly and respect
developing countries' sovereignty.
While it is probably true that many investors using swaps often
would have invested in the particular developing country anyway, the
discount on debt-equity swaps enables these investors to invest greater
amounts than otherwise.1 4 Moreover, many critics ignore the fact
that the developing country directly participates in the debt-equity
swap. If the debtor nation's central bank believes that a particular
foreign investment would enter anyway, it may simply refuse to make
the swap." 5 Also, if a sudden need for foreign currency arises, the
developing country may postpone debt-equity swaps temporarily, and
consider offering to foreign investors a preferential exchange rate at
a like discount so as not to lose the investment.
The objection that the repatriation of profits will nullify any positive
effect that the debt-equity swap will have on the debtor nation's
balance of payments ignores the foreign exchange benefits of direct
foreign investment. Through its export earnings, the enterprise will
naturally increase the foreign exchange of the host country, or al-
situation changed in the early 1980's when oil prices slumped and Venezuela, de-
pendent upon oil revenues for foreign exchange, experienced its own debt crisis.
After undergoing restructuring and severe austerity measures, Venezuela has changed
its attitude towards direct foreign investment. In 1986, Venezuela liberalized its
foreign investment regulations and Venezuela will likely ratify the Andean Pact's
Decision 220, the new pro-foreign investment code, which will replace Decision 24.
See Frances, After Boosting Reserves U.S. Banks Are Less Likely To Grant New
Latin Loans, Christ. Sci. Monitor, June 4, 1987, at 18, col. 1.
"13 Advanced developing countries frequently must choose between external fi-
nancing or direct foreign investment. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
114 "Sure, the investment might have come in anyway," admits Jay Newman,
Senior Vice President of Shearson Lehman Brothers, "[blut the swap adds that
additional $20 million to $30 million to it." Marton, supra note 98, at 177.
"I3 Or it miy split the discount with the foreign investor. Mexico uses this method.
See Ollard, supra note 99, at 72. If the debtor nation's central bank has difficulty
identifying new foreign investment, the developing country may encourage U.S.
banks to take full equity positions in debtor state enterprises under the new liberalized
Regulation K. See supra note 100. Since U.S. banking regulations would not permit
the U.S. bank to invest otherwise, this would guarantee that the debt-equity swap
resulted in new investment. Furthermore, under the new Regulation K, the bank
must divest its holdings in 5 years, minimizing the danger that the developing country
would permanently lose control of an important sector of its economy. The state
may simply repurchase the enterprise in 5 years or allow it to be sold to local
investors.
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ternatively the enterprise will save foreign exchange through its do-
mestic sales by providing goods and services that would otherwise
have been imported. Thus, as a result of the direct foreign investment,
foreign exchange accumulates within the host country and its balance
of payments improves. If the enterprise has earned a profit, the
balance of payments will already have been improved beyond the
amount that can be repatriated as profit;" 6 if the foreign-owned
enterprise is unprofitable, the host country will not lose foreign
exchange because there will be no profits to repatriate." 7
Nevertheless, despite the arguments in favor of debt-equity swaps,
excessive use of swaps will aggravate inflation in the developing
countries." 8 Issuing domestic currency to the foreign investor expands
the developing country's money supply, which increases aggregate
demand, and thus makes necessary an expansion in output to avoid
further inflation. Yet, because output frequently cannot be expanded
sufficiently many developing countries must restrict the amount of
swaps in specific time periods," 9 further restricting the debt-equity
swaps' effectiveness as a debt strategy. In 1986, the swaps eliminated
only $5 billion of nearly $800 billion in developing country debt. 120
Judging by the capital inflows during the boom years of the late
1970's, experts estimate that debt-equity swaps at today's prices can
eliminate only $8 billion in debt annually in Latin America, despite
aggressive campaigns to locate new investment opportunities. 121
16 "A debtor country normally has a fixed interest burden. No matter how the
country is performing it must meet its debt service obligations. Debt-equity swaps
replace the fixed interest burden with more variable and usually lower outflow of
dividends derived from production and profits ... " Kuczynski, supra note 73, at
149.
117 By contrast, a state enterprise must service its debt even if the enterprise is
unprofitable, thus depressing the developing country's balance of payments further.
I William R. Cline of the Institute for International Economics points out:
"Because external debt is large relative to the domestic money supply, large scale
[debt-equity] conversions could involve inflationary monetary expansion." Wall St.
J., June 11, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
"I See French, Mexico's Capital Idea, EuROMONEY, Sept. 1986, at 167, 170.
Another approach is for the central bank to sell bonds to decrease the money supply.
But this just replaces external debt with internal, which many economists feel is
more dangerous because internal debt generally carries a higher interest rate. See
N.Y. Times, May 4, 1987, at DIO, col. 4; A Lesson from Chile, ECONOMIST, Mar.
7, 1987, at 87, 88.
110 N.Y. Times, June 1, 1987, at Dl, D3, col. 1.
2I Kuczynski, supra note 73, at 145. Additionally, debt-equity swaps may encourage
capital flight if people using the swaps are not adequately supervised. A simple
example will illustrate how this could occur. Suppose a Chilean manufacturer used
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B. Criteria For A New Debt Strategy
Many who sympathize with the struggle of the developing countries
believe that large write-offs or defaults are the only realistic solution
to the debt crisis. 22 Others argue that the reverse is true: large scale
write-offs or defaults would signify a failure to find a solution to
the debt crisis and would impair future borrowing for the debtor
nations. 23 Both positions have merit. Given the present low levels of
foreign investment in developing countries, a large scale write-off or
default would likely end capital inflows and endanger economic de-
velopment. Debtor countries could be forced to conduct international
business on a cash basis, stifling trade. 24 On the other hand, few
people argue that the debt is actually worth 100 cents on the dollar,
and many agree that creditor banks should receive something less
than the book value of their loans as part of an equitable debt
strategy. 125
A comprehensive long-term debt strategy that reduces advanced
developing countries' outstanding debt and revives net capital inflows
the foreign exchange he obtained through exports to purchase Chilean debt from
Citicorp at 70 percent of its face value in local currency, used the local currency
to purchase dollars in the parallel market, and invested his dollars abroad. The
Chilean exporter's profit from the swap would be 20/70, or 29 percent, less inter-
mediation fees and exchange losses. With such large profits available, the debtor
nation's central bank must insure that the domestic currency an investor receives in
the swap will be invested in the country and not reconverted in the parallel market
for investment abroad. See American Banker, Sept. 25, 1987, at 21, col. 2.
122 See Kuttner, Third World Debt: A Flawed Solution, Bus. WK., Jan, 19, 1987,
at 18. See also, Marton, supra note 98, at 177.
123 Opponents of debt forgiveness, most notably the Treasury Department,
the Federal Reserve Board, and commercial banks, contend that such a
measure fails on two counts: morally, because it would penalize faithful
debt-servicing clients and damage the LDC's own future credit ratings, and
financially, because it would weaken the banking system and world financial
markets, of which the developing countries are an integral part. Bankers
and their academic supporters believe that debt cancellation would under-
mine the borrowing countries' incentives for sound economic policies. Forc-
ing banks to suffer losses, they hold, would hurt the LDC's own credit
ratings and result in little or no fresh private lending to the LDC's.
Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 153. "Cajoling banks to lend new money is difficult
enough in today's circumstances; it would be impossible if combined with forced
debt write-downs. No lender would willingly make new loans knowing that those
loans would be immediately marked down below face value." Weinert, supra note
79, at 94.
,14 Kuczynski, supra note 73, at 129-30.
2I The new approach in debt negotiations is for banks to sell the debt at a
discount, thus reducing the debtor nations' total debt burden. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4,
1988, at DI, col. 3.
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must be implemented quickly in order to save these countries from
default and restore economic growth. The goals for a successful debt
strategy must include: (1) arranging long-term, flexible loan-service
agreements with realistic and attainable payment obligations; (2) re-
storing international confidence in debtors' solvency to revive net
capital inflows without resorting to heavy-handed, obtrusive, and
politically difficult IMF agreements; and (3) regulating future private
lending to developing countries to avoid the recurrence of similar
debt problems.
Such a program would address the past mistakes of the containment
-strategy, which focused solely on short-term balance of payments
deficits through "a minimum of financing and a maximum of ad-
justment,' ' 26 and pursuant to which commercial bankers merely
lengthened maturities and postponed principal payments, doing noth-
ing to alleviate the high interest burden and restore capital inflows. 27
A comprehensive long-term debt strategy requires a shift in em-
phasis from the service of debt to economic development; the former
will not be possible without the latter. 28 Presently, rising interest
rates, protectionism, and falling commodity prices all directly affect
a debtor nation's ability to service its debt. To ensure realistic debt
service obligations that allow for economic growth, a debtor nation's
repayment schedule must adjust for deteriorating external economic
conditions. Otherwise, a debtor must continually borrow just to make
interest payments. Flexible debt service obligations allow real progress
to be made toward debt reduction, and also make debtor countries
more amenable to instituting further economic reforms. 2 9
While debtor nations cannot control external economic conditions,
they can affect their internal economic performance and, pursuant
to the second goal above, debtor nations must take steps to restore
international confidence in their solvency and prospects for long-term
126 Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 144.
12? See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
2 Amuzegar has suggested two basic rules for a debt strategy: "First, both debtors
and creditors must commit to pursuing high employment growth devoid of a strict
ideological underpinning. Second, both sides must accept reciprocal responsibility
for each other's economic fortunes." Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 156.
129 Tying debt service to external economic conditions has certain international
political advantages for debtor countries as well: commercial bankers become "foreign
economic ambassadors" for their debtor governments. For example, if protectionism
continues to gain popularity in the U.S. Congress, U.S. bankers holding developing
country debt will want to protect their debtor countries' export markets, and therefore
will likely lobby against protectionist measures.
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economic growth. Only if this confidence is restored will capital
inflows - particularly direct foreign investment - be revived.' 30
A debt strategy that relies on monitoring by foreign governments,
commercial banks, or international agencies like the IMF should be
avoided for two reasons. First, a foreign agency, while not subject
to domestic political pressures to overspend, is less sensitive to the
limits of adjustment measures. Second, a foreign agency will often
cause a great deal of, political discomfort for the debtor country
government. Debtor government officials are seen as weak, and often
their political careers are sacrificed,' 3' the outside interference being
perceived as a deprivation of sovereignty. Instead, a more viable
solution would be to devise a market mechanism that encourages the
efficient use of resources and penalizes excessive spending.
C. Securitization of Debt
The swapping of advanced-developing-country debt for some form
of high-yielding securities, and the development of a mature and
active secondary market for these securities should be the basis of
the new comprehensive market-based debt strategy.3 2 The goal is to
create a market mechanism that meets the second and third criteria
above (restoring international confidence in debtors' solvency and
regulating future private lending), while still managing to satisfy the
first (achieving realistic debt service obligations). The securities created
must have relatively high yields in order to facilitate the development
and active functioning of a secondary market.
The market mechanism would regulate lending as follows: if the
capital invested in the developing country is not used efficiently, the
debtor country's growth prospects diminish, as do the investor's
prospects of realizing high yields on the debtor country's securities.
Low-yielding securities will inhibit the debtor country's ability to sell
more securities, thus effectively restricting credit until the debtor
country makes necessary economic reforms.'33
130 Kuczynski, supra note 73, at 138.
31 The former Brazilian Minister of Finance, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, found
himself in the typical position for developing country finance ministers: caught
between quick-spending politicians at home and foreign creditors demanding that
more restrictive monetary policies be implemented. See Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1987,
at 33, col. 1.
"3 Richard S. Weinert suggested a third-world-debt-for-government-bonds swap.
He suggested that the bonds be issued by the World Bank or creditor governments.
Weinert, supra note 79, at 96-97.
"I Such price sensitivity to debtor nations' economic policies has already occurred
in the secondary third world loan market. See id., at 85.
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Such a market mechanism would absorb minor fluctuations in the
yield of the securities so that the debtor country's creditworthiness
would remain undamaged. If the return falls slightly, the price on
the bonds will simply adjust downward as demand shifts to competing
investments until the return is brought back up to the levels of the
competing investments. If the market price of the debtor country's
securities drops too low, then the country's credit would contract.
This consequence would provide the incentive for the debtor country
to pursue sound domestic economic policies. Significantly, even after
the debt crisis arrived and developing countries were unable to con-
tinue servicing their debt, these countries still made interest payments
on bonds held by investors other than banks, "so as not to damage
their reputation in the bond markets."''3 4
An active secondary market in these securities must be developed
and maintained for the proper functioning of the market mechanism.
With an actively functioning secondary market, security prices will
respond quickly to changes within the developing country, and this
market mechanism will encourage the efficient use of capital resources
within the developing countries, thus facilitating new capital inflows
and economic growth over the long-term.
This market-based debt strategy to some extent takes the commercial
banks out of the business of sovereign lending and forces developing
countries to use the same sources of capital as developed countries.
If commercial banks wanted to pursue more sovereign lending, they
would be forced to offer more favorable terms than the developing
countries could obtain in the securities markets. Such competition is
healthy and improves the overall efficiency of the system. Although
some commercial banks would undoubtedly object to such a strategy,
other commercial banks that have substantial investment banking
services (such as the J. P. Morgan Corporation) would likely support
it, because they could earn profits by dealing in the new securities.
Market-based regulation of private lending to developing countries
has other important advantages over traditional forms of regulation.
Market-based regulation is devoid of the perceived ideological tutelage
by creditor-country governments and the IMF. The developing coun-
tries would be free to organize their economies as they wish as long
as suitable economic performance is maintained, and this would be
more acceptable politically in the debtor countries. More importantly,
134 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1985, at 121.
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a market mechanism would regulate private lending to developing
countries much more efficiently than any administrative agency be-
cause prices on the securities would respond immediately to changes
in economic conditions within the debtor countries. Such perform-
ance-sensitive regulation is necessary to alleviate the excessive swings
in international lending to developing countries.
Securitization of debt is not a new idea. In 1985, Argentina offered
"exit bonds" for smaller bank creditors who wanted to liquidate
their loans.'35 The exit bonds failed to sell, however, because the
discounts that Argentina required from the banks were too steep and
the banks believed that they could obtain a better deal in other
ways.3 6 Brazil also forwarded a debt securitization plan'3 7 in Sep-
tember, 1987, in the form of a voluntary "long-term approach" that
would allow banks to swap their loans for tradeable long-term bonds. 3
Because the Brazilian bonds' par value would equal the face value
of the debt, 39 the banks would not have been required to swap their
debt at a discount, and this factor made the Brazilian plan more
attractive to banks than Argentina's had been two years before. In
addition, the new bonds would have been more marketable than the
old debt, reducing the commercial banks' risks in holding the se-
curitized debt, and Brazil indicated that the yield on these bonds
-3 See N.Y. Times, May 5, 1987, at DI, col. 2.
136 See ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1987, at 87; Kuczynski, supra note 73, at 133, n. 2.
137 Brazil is an attractive country in which to attempt a debt securitization strategy.
Of all the advanced developing countries, Brazil is the most industrialized and has
more opportunities for investment. Since Brazil made this proposal, Mexico has
followed with its own plan for securitization of its debt. See infra text accompanying
notes 149-57.
,3, The voluntary long-term approach was presented to a committee of fourteen
international banks in Washington at the end of September, 1987 after being endorsed
by U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker. Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1987, at 35, col.
4. The voluntary long-term approach was one of two options that Brazil had offered
the banks. The first option, a "conventional approach", asked that the debt be
rescheduled at an interest rate margin of no more than LIBOR. At the time, the
standard interest rate in reschedulings with Mexico and the Philippines was 13/16
of a percentage point above LIBOR. ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1987, at 87. Giving Brazil
a more favorable rate would cause other debtors to demand renegotiations. A London
banker commented on the effect of offering a special interest rate concession to one
debtor country: "No bank is going to accept that . . . it would open a Pandora's
box." Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1987, at 29, col. 1. Under either option Brazil requested
$10.4 billion to help cover bank debt interest payments through the end of 1989.
See Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1987, at 35, col. 4. See also Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1987,
at 39, col. 3.
139 Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1987, at 39, col. 3.
19881
GA. J. -INT'L & Comp. L.
would be increased if Brazil's economic performance improved sig-
nificantly.
However, the commercial banks showed only lukewarm interest in
the Brazilian bond offer. The mere promise of higher yields was not
enough to entice the commercial banks; in order to make the bonds
attractive, their yields must be high enough to compete with less-
risky but lower-yielding securities in the industrialized world.' 40
Brazil's securitization of debt strategy would require several ad-
ditional features to fulfill the criteria of the comprehensive debt
strategy proposed herein and to ensure participation by the commercial
banks. To achieve realistic and attainable debt service obligations,
Brazil should not allow creditor banks to swap their debt at a zero
discount, especially when Brazilian debt is being traded on the sec-
ondary loan market for 50 cents on the dollar.' 4' Brazil must take
advantage of every opportunity to reduce its debt payments to a
more manageable level. In addition, the Brazilian proposal should
provide for automatic interest deferral when external economic con-
ditions make it difficult for Brazil to meet these payments. 142 This
could be accomplished by tying the bond interest payments to Brazil's
trade balance. If Brazil's trade balance worsened due to external
economic conditions, 43 then less interest would be paid and the yield
on the bonds would drop; if this balance improved, Brazil may decide
to distribute some or all of its additional foreign exchange as interest,
increasing the yield and the marketability of the bonds. If the bond's
yield is already attractive to investors, instead of paying additional
interest, Brazil may decide to use the additional foreign exchange to
purchase some of its debt on the secondary loan market and retire
some of its total debt burden.' 44
,40 Nevertheless, in June, 1988, Brazil agreed to end its moratorium on interest
payments while its creditors agreed to loan Brazil $5.2 billion and restructure Brazil's
debt at lower interest rates. The agreement was the first of its kind not to be
conditioned upon an IMF agreement with Brazil. Brazil also agreed to allow a menu
of options for banks to reduce their debt including debt-equity swaps, exit bonds,
and securitization of debt. Berg, Brazil Debt Pact Called Innovative, N.Y. Times,
June 23, 1988, at Dl, col. 3.
141 Id.
142 The Brazilian proposal only allowed bond interest payments to increase.
,, A multinational financial authority would determine when a drop in a debtor's
trade surplus resulted from external economic conditions beyond the debtor's power
to control. See infra text accompanying notes 161-62.
" Brazil could also purchase its own bonds to maintain their market price. To
protect bondholders, however, Brazil must agree never to buy back its bonds when
they are selling at a discount. Otherwise, Brazil could take advantage of low prices
on its bonds due to its own inefficiencies.
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However, automatic interest deferrals, even if limited to declines
in a developing country's trade surplus caused by external economic
conditions, will make that country's bonds less attractive to investors,
and such deferrals are thus counter-productive in attempts to create
an active secondary market in these securities. A conflict, therefore,
arises between the desire to protect a developing country from adverse
external economic conditions and the desire to create an active sec-
ondary market for its bonds.
The solution is to develop some type of guarantee for the bonds
without destroying the market mechanism in the process. This can
be accomplished by guaranteeing the payment of any interest deferred
due to external economic conditions. In this way the developing
country's internal economic performance will still be reflected in the
price of the bonds. While there are numerous methods in which to
guarantee interest payments, only three will be discussed here: (1)
having bondholders swap their debt for equity in the developing
country; (2) having creditor governments pay the interest; or (3) having
debtor governments pay the interest using their foreign exchange
reserves held by the IMF.
The first method borrows from the corporate finance instrument
of convertible corporate bonds. Under this method, the developing
country would agree to allow its bondholders to swap their bonds
for equity investments in that country if a default occurs. This
"convertible upon default" guarantee provides the developing country
with an additional incentive to keep its interest obligations current.
A default would result in massive direct foreign investment arranged
through debt-equity swaps. This type of guarantee, however, would
not fully secure the government bonds. The convertability of these
bonds would be subject to the same limitations as debt-equity swaps. 45
If the automatic interest deferral is a result of external economic
problems, some experts argue that the fair solution is to have the
creditor governments or the World Bank guarantee to pay the deferred
interest.' 46 Brazil's finance minister, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, has
indicated that he would like to see the World Bank offer such a
guarantee. 147 The reaction to this suggestion, however, has been gen-
141 See supra text accompanying notes 108-21.
,46 Amuzegar, supra note 15, at 156-57.
,47 Melloan, Brazil Still Gropes for the Right Debt-Formula, Wall St. J., Sept.
29, 1987, at 39, col. 3.
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erally negative. Many politicians within the creditor governments feel
that the guarantee would be perceived as bailing out the banks,
although this attitude seems to be slowly changing.
48
The Mexican government has successfully implemented a debt se-
curitization strategy that offers a creditor government's guarantee.
49
The guarantee, however, is limited to paying the bond's face value
at maturity. On December 29, 1987, the U.S. Treasury agreed to
issue up to $10 billion worth of 20-year zero-coupon bonds to Mexico
for up to $2 billion. 50 Mexico then offered to swap new Mexican
bonds for its old debt at a substantial discount. The Mexican bonds
offered higher interest rates than the old debt and are guaranteed by
the U.S. Treasury bonds. Creditors were asked to submit bids on
the amount of old Mexican debt they would be willing to swap and
at what discount.
Unfortunately, the major U.S. commercial banks refused to par-
ticipate.'5 ' These banks felt that the new Mexican bonds were still
not marketable because only the principal was guaranteed. To trade
the bonds, the banks would have to discount them an additional 20
to 25 percent. This would mean that the banks could only offer a
20 to 25 percent discount in the debt-for-bonds swap offer; otherwise,
bank losses would exceed 50 percent, at which point it would have
been better for the banks to unload their debt on the secondary loan
market - where Mexican debt trades at 50 cents on the dollar. 52
In addition, a recent Securities and Exchange Commission ruling,"
made participation very risky for the bigger creditors, even if their
bids were not accepted by Mexico. The Commission now requires
any bank that offers to swap its debt at a discount to immediately
write off as a loss the discounted amount or to increase bank loan-
loss reserves by the same amount. 5 4
While the Mexican plan failed to receive the support of major U.S.
banks, some large European banks and many regional U.S. banks
did participate. 5 5 The European banks participated because they were
149 Id.
141 Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
110 A large discount from face value is offered on the zero coupon bonds because
they do not pay interest. Id.
"I' Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
152 Id.
1"3 SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 75; reprinted in American Banker, Jan. 7,
1988, at 10, col. 1.
154 Id.
115 Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
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required to expand their loan-loss reserves to as much as 70 percent.
Large U.S. and British banks, by comparison, are only required to
have reserves of 25 to 30 percent. Swapping the debt at a 50 percent
discount thus enabled continental European banks to recoup some
of the loss from their excess reserves. The U.S. regional banks par-
ticipated because they have insufficient capital bases to continue
participating in developing country lending. 5 6 The Mexican strategy
has therefore been called a "qualified success" since Mexico did
manage to write off $3 billion of its debt - although it fell far short
of the $10 billion projected. 5 7
The third method of guaranteeing interest payments was proposed
at the annual World Bank-IMF meeting in the fall of 1988. Japanese
delegates suggested that the advanced developing countries' foreign
exchange reserves held by the IMF could be used to guarantee interest
on bond issues.' 58 This proposal, however, met with considerable
political resistance. The United States objected strongly because the
plan gives the IMF additional powers at a time when U.S. influence
over the IMF is waning. 15 9 Nevertheless, the Japanese guarantee scheme
is feasible and should be given serious consideration.
In summary, securitization of debt will, at a minimum, be an
important component of future attempts to arrive at a debt strategy.
If used in a manner similar to that described above, securitization
of debt could become the basis of a comprehensive, long-term debt
strategy that regulates future private lending to developing countries.
If the securities are marketable so that an active secondary market
develops, a market mechanism will emerge that encourages developing
countries to utilize their resources efficiently. Through this process,
international confidence in debtors' solvency will be restored without
resorting to problematic IMF agreements.
To achieve realistic debt service amounts, however, the bond interest
payments must be automatically deferred in response to external
economic conditions that adversely effect the debtor nations' trade
balances. The key to maintaining the marketability of the bonds while
allowing an automatic interest deferral is to provide a guarantee that
156 See id.
157 Id.
"I Mossberg, Brady Warns IMF and Japan on New Plans, Wall St. J., Sept. 28,
1988, at 21, col. 1. Only the most advanced developing countries such as Brazil
could guarantee a bond issue in this manner. Most developing countries have in-
sufficient foreign exchange reserves. Id.
159 Id.
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the interest on the bonds will be paid regardless of external economic
conditions. However, so as not to destroy the market mechanism's
effect, the interest deferral and corresponding guarantee must be in
response to external economic conditions only. Bond prices must
respond freely to the debtor country's internal economic performance
for the market mechanism to work. 16°
D. Creating A Multilateral Financial Authority
A multilateral financial authority will be necessary to manage the
debt strategy proposed herein. The authority's duties should be spe-
cific and strictly limited so as not to interfere with the functioning
of the market mechanism. The authority should (1) decide whether
or not a decline in a debtor's trade surplus is due to external economic
conditions; and (2) pay the interest deferred on bonds as a result of
such a decline.
Congress recently proposed the creation of a similar authority. As
originally conceived, the International Debt Management Act required
the Secretary of the Treasury to begin negotiations with other creditor
governments to create a multilateral financial authority. The Act
described a multilateral financial authority that would purchase sov-
ereign debt of less-developed countries from private creditors at an
appropriate discount. This debt could then be either resold to the
debtor country at the same discount, swapped for equity assets in
the debtor country, securitized by the debt authority, or merely held
by the authority as the new creditor of the debtor country. The
modified version which finally was passed by Congress merely directs
the Secretary of the Treasury to study the feasibility and advisability
of establishing an International Debt Management Authority and
report back to Congress with the results.' 61
160 Kuczynski lists three key requirements for a successful deferral scheme: political
viability in the creditor countries, financial viability for the major bank lenders, and
real cash-flow relief for the debtors. Kuczynski, supra note 73, at 141. The debt
strategy proposed herein meets all three requirements. Because the bonds would only
be guaranteed for the loss of interest due to external economic forces and banks
would be required to securitize their debt at a substantial discount, creditor gov-
ernments could not be accused of giving debtors a free ride or bailing out the banks.
Moreover, the banks would only take a one-time loss, likely not much more than
the 20 to 30 percent they have already set aside in loan-loss reserves. Finally, debtor
countries would benefit from an immediate debt reduction, a corresponding reduction
in their interest burden, and a much greater freedom to use their foreign exchange
for economic development.
161 The International Debt Management Act, as originally conceived, failed to pass
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The International Debt Management Act describes an authority
with powers much more extensive than necessary. Consequently, the
Reagan Administration strongly opposed the proposed authority. For-
mer Treasury Secretary James Baker, Federal Reserve Board Chair-
man Alan Greenspan and World Bank President Barber Conable all
oppose the concept of a sweeping, all-inclusive institution that would
buy up debt. 162
The multilateral financial authority proposed herein would be more
likely to receive the broad support necessary, because much smaller
capital contributions would be needed, and because such an authority,
would not buy up debt and thus would less likely be perceived as
bailing out the banks.
. IV. CONCLUSION
The international debt crisis is likely to confound those seeking
"black letter" law in the field of banking regulation. In the United
States, for example, banks must obey a long list of rules and re-
gulations established by the FDIC, the Comptroller's Office, and the
Federal Reserve. But on the international level, legally binding rules
and regulations "are the exception rather than the rule.' '163 Govern-
ments have typically ignored the need for comprehensive, uniform
international bank regulations; instead, individual governments at-
tempt to separately regulate the international banking activities of
banks chartered in their countries.' 64
Congress. The new version is much less pioneering in scope. If the Secretary of the
Treasury determines that initiation of international discussions to create an inter-
national debt management authority would (1) materially increase the debt discount,
(2) materially increase the probability of default, or (3) materially enhance the
likelihood of debt service failure or disruption, the Secretary should report his
determination to Congress and not initiate any international discussions. Omnibus
Trade and Competiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, § 3111, 102 STAT. 137, 22
U.S.C. § 5331 (1988).
The Act requires debtor governments to substantially commit themselves to ec-
onomic policies designed to improve resource utilization and minimize capital flight,
and to prepare an economic management plan that sustains economic growth and
allows debtors to meet their restructured debt obligations. Moreover, the Act requires
that countries with strong current account surpluses (presumably this refers to Japan)
should provide greater financial support for the authority. Id.
62 See Truell & Mossberg, Executive to Propose World Debt Plan, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 29, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
163 Bench & Sable, supra note 7, at 429.
164 It is encouraging to note that there has been a softening of governments'
positions recently. Following a bilateral agreement between the United States and
19881
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Several fundamental weaknesses in the current fragmented super-
visory system of private international lending to developing countries
are now apparent: domestic bank regulators cannot prevent excessive
swings in international bank lending to developing countries; com-
mercial banks are unable to adequately measure the risks involved
in lending to the developing countries; and the IMF cannot adequately
supervise the debtor nations' economic policies.165 Because of these
weaknesses, the debt crisis has reached a near critical stage with over
$1 trillion of developing country debt outstanding.
A long-term comprehensive debt strategy is needed and must be
adopted quickly. The securitization of debt strategy proposed herein
shifts the focus of debt relief from the servicing of debt to fostering
the economic development of the developing countries, recognizing
that the former cannot be realized without the latter.
It is difficult to be optimistic when discussing the debt crisis, given
the constraints on both debtors and creditors and the enormity of
the numbers involved. However, in 1987 creditors for the first time
publicly recognized that Third World debt is partially uncollectible.
Creditors now seem willing to accept some losses in order to chip
away at the debt mountain. Some have also indicated that they are
willing to try some unconventional approaches, as the recent emer-
gence of market-based strategies such as debt-equity swaps and debt
securitization illustrates. Debtors, for their part, are opening their
economies to more direct foreign investment and have offered in-
novative proposals in an attempt to honor their commitments. Thus,
the time is ripe for negotiating a long-term, comprehensive debt
strategy. One thing is certain, allowing private lending to developing
countries to continue unregulated will make the debt mountain in-
surmountable.
Bradley K. Boyd
the United Kingdom on minimum capital adequacy standards for all banks in both
countries, the Cooke Committee successfully adopted its own minimum capital
adequacy standards in June, 1988. Nash, 12 Countries Want Banks to Increase
Capital, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1987, at Al, col. 2. As a result, commercial banks
will be able to compete on a level playing field internationally, no longer helped or
hindered by varying domestic capital requirements.
165 See Friesen, Regulatory Issues Arise with Globalization of Financial Markets,
American Banker, July 31, 1987, at 4.
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